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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Plaintiffs-Appellees are JAMES LOVENDAHL, SUE 
LOVENDAHL and WESLEY LOVENDAHL, all natural persons and 
residents of Riverton, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
The Defendant JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT is a political 
subdivision and body politic of the State of Utah, having 
primary responsibility to administer and operate a public 
school system for a portion of Salt Lake County. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is granted 
pursuant to the provision of Section 78-2-2(3) (j) , Utah Code 
[appeals from district court]. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal (and the predicate factual and procedural 
situation involving this case) presents the following issues 
for review: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment when the Defendant School 
District did not show that it was entitled "as a 
matter of law" to judgment, specifically: 
a. that the School District's routine 
disposal of everyday "sewage", as a 
4 
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product of the restroom facilities 
(toilets and sinks) as well as the food-
preparation facilities in the elementary-
school cafeteria, into and through the 
sanitary sewer collection system falls 
under the "exception" to the waiver of 
governmental immunity under Section 63-
30-10(18) (c) ["mitigating, or handling 
hazardous materials or hazardous 
wastes"], when the "domestic sewage" is 
not so regulated by the state or federal 
governments and said state and federal 
regulations specifically exclude domestic 
sewage from regulation. 
b. whether or not hydrogen sulfide gas, 
as a natural bi-product of the 
putrif ication of "domestic sewage" within 
the sanitary sewer system from the 
Riverton Elementary School, is, as a 
matter of law, a "hazardous material" for 
which immunity is retained under 
Subsection 63-30-10(18)(c), Utah Code 
[immunity exceptions] 
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2. Whether the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment when genuine issues of fact would 
otherwise prevent the granting of summary 
judgment. The disputed issues of fact include but 
are not limited to: 
a. whether or not "hydrogen sulfide" 
within the meaning of the immunity 
statute is as a matter of fact 
actually "regulated" in fact when the 
District provided no permits from the 
national EPA or the state Department of 
Environmental Quality indicating the 
District was allowed to handle or dispose 
of the "regulated" chemical. 
b. whether or not the Plaintiff's 
property was factually "taken" or 
"damaged" for public use by the 
Defendant's disposal activities of the 
claimed "hazardous materials". 
3, Whether the trial court erred in ruling that 
the "exception" under 63-30-10(18)(c) [immunity 
retained for handling "hazardous materials"] 
overrides the "waivers" of immunity under Sections 
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63-30-10.5 ["inverse condemnation"], as well as 
the constitutionality of such "retention of 
immunity" in light of the provisions of Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that 
the "exception" under 63-30-10(18) (c) [immunity 
retained for handling "hazardous materials"] 
overrides the "waivers" of immunity under Sections 
63-30-8 [defective improvements] and 63-30-9 
[dangerous conditions] 
5. Whether the state-promulgated administrative 
regulations pertaining to "clean air within the 
classrooms" provide the District from immunity 
from Plaintiffs' claims for "nuisance" and 
"inverse condemnation". 
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The interpretation and application of provisions of the 
state and national constitutions as well as Utah statute by 
the trial court are matters of law. The trial court's 
conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for 
correctness. United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park 
City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme Court 1993); 
Society of Separationists, Inc. vs Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 
7 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
1341 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). 
This standard of review has also been referred to as a 
"correction of error standard". Jacobsen Investment Company 
vs State Tax Commission, 839 P. 2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1992); Sanders vs Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1992). "Correction of error" means that no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on 
questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah 
Supreme Court 19 94); Provo River Water Users' Association vs 
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). The 
"correction of error" standard means that the appellate 
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in 
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State 
vs Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) ; Howell 
vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) . 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate 
court accords no deference to the trial court, but reviews 
the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. Kranz 
vs Holt, 819 P. 2d 352 (Utah 1991) . The appellate court views 
the facts and inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party opposing summary judgment. 
Kranz, supra; Guardian State Bank vs Humpherys, 7 62 P.2d 
1084, 1086 (Utah 1988); Horgan vs Industrial Design 
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Corporation, 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant are 
essentially those of (1) "nuisance" and (2) an 
uncompensated "taking or damaging of private property 
without payment of just compensation". 
The claims arise from the Defendant's actions in 
installing, maintaining and operating a sewer vent pipe, 
upon which an electrically-powered blower unit was 
installed, unreasonably interfered with the Plaintiffs' use 
of their real estate and residential dwelling located a few 
feet away from the sewer vent pipe. 
The operative facts behind this litigation are not, per 
se, in genuine dispute: 
1. The School District as the owner/operator of 
the Riverton Elementary School on a 12-acre site 
in Riverton, Salt Lake County faced a problem of 
undesirable "sewer gas" smells, apparently 
emanating from the sewage-collection system 
connected to the newly-constructed elementary 
school1. The District, attempting to solve the 
lrThe sewer gas "smell" was almost immediately noticeable when 
the newly-constructed elementary school was first opened for 
classes in about 1996. 
9 
STEPHEN 0 HOMER 
"smell" problem, claimed for years from 1996 to 
2000 that the gases, smells and odors were not 
harmful. In 1996 the District installed a "sewer 
vent pipe", approximately 10 inches in diameter 
and approximately 20 feet high, atop which was 
located an electrically-power blower fan to suck 
the gases, vapors and odors from the "sanitary 
sewer lateral" from the Elementary School and 
discharge those gases uncontrolled into the 
atmosphere. The "sewer vent pipe" was located 
hundreds of feet from the school building, but a 
mere 17 feet from the Plaintiffs7 single-family 
residential dwelling. The Plaintiffs almost 
immediately thereafter complained. 
2. In May 1997 the Plaintiffs filed a formal 
"notice of claim" for the "nuisance" and related 
legal injuries and issues. The District did 
nothing. In December 1997 the instant litigation 
was filed. The District still did nothing: it 
continued to "vent" the sewer pipe through the 
powered fan. 
3. In February 1998 the District, ostensibly 
unable to ascertain the cause of the offensive 
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"sewer gas" odors within the Elementary School, 
"closed" the Riverton Elementary School, forcing 
the bussing of approximately eight hundred 
students for a period of approximately four 
months, to other schools within the District. The 
District continued to operate the sewer vent pipe 
and blower adjacent to Plaintiffs' residence. 
4. In March 1998 after almost TWO YEARS of 
conscious inaction and only when facing in the 
District Court a "preliminary injunction" hearing 
LATER THAT DAY did the District finally agree to 
"cap" the sewer vent pipe. Subsequently to the 
issuance of the preliminary injunction directing 
the District to "cap" the vent pipe, the District 
removed the piping and blower unit and has 
apparently permanently sealed the opening to the 
sewer line. That cessation of the nuisance-
activity and the "capping" of the vent pipe 
particularly when under court order to do so 
does not, however, excuse the District's liability 
for its previous tortious conduct and the damages 
resulting therefrom. 
5. In November 2000 the District in a major 
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departure from its historic, publicly-proclaimed 
position (that the odors, albeit annoying, were 
NOT harmful to the students or the public) 
announced and claimed that the sewer gases, 
including the hydrogen sulfide ("rotten egg gas"), 
within the sanitary sewer drain system were 
"hazardous materials" and that the District was 
thus immune from suit under the provisions of 
Section 63-30-10(18), Utah Code. 
6. In December 2000 the District Court conducted 
an oral argument hearing and ultimately granted (8 
February 2001) the Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, dismissing the Plaintiff's 
remaining claims. [Many of the Plaintiffs' claims 
had been previously dismissed under governmental 
immunity grounds.] 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DEFENDANT JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P., requires that before the moving 
party is entitled to summary judgment, there must be (1) no 
genuine dispute as to material fact AND (2) the moving party 
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case, 
the Defendant submitted no "affidavits", but relied instead 
on an illogical and, as will be shown, sloppy and 
jurisprudentially-inaccurate reading of the Governmental 
Immunity Act to justify its position. 
The Defendant acknowledged that the materials contained 
within the sewer line (which it intentionally vented) 
approximately 17 feet from the Plaintiffs' residence, are 
"harmful and hazardous materials". Nevertheless, the 
District attempted to shield itself under the cloak of 
"governmental immunity" under Section 63-30-10(18) of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
A 
THE JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
HAVING NO STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR THE REGULATION, MITIGATION OR HANDLING 
OF "HAZARDOUS MATERIALS", IS NOT WITHIN 
THE CLASS OF GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES FOR WHICH 
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT WAS CONTEMPLATED 
The Defendant JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT is a governmental 
unit, created and charged with the responsibility to operate 
and administer a public school system, for the education of 
children in kindergarten through high school. The District 
has NO STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY OR MANDATE to handle or 
regulate "hazardous waste", as such, and is thus not within 
the "class" of Utah governmental agencies such as the 
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Department of Environmental Quality and the Department of 
Health which are so statutorily charged and created. 
Obviously, the Legislature intended to shield those 
agencies from the potentially-extraordinary claims (for 
negligence and/or liability) in this field. The Legislature 
did not intend the grant of immunity to extend to a local 
school district, negligently operating the sewage disposal 
system from its toilets, sinks and food-preparation 
facilities, from suit for nuisance arising from the damaging 
effect intentionally inflicted upon an adjacent 
propertyowner! 
In this context the argument and assertion of the 
District (as to entitlement to immunity) is similar to those 
unsuccessful arguments raised by other governmental entities 
operating OUTSIDE of their limited area of responsibility. 
In Williams vs Board of Education, 780 P.2d 818 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1989)] , the school district that this was a 
school district is merely coincidence, because the argument 
could likely have been advanced by any governmental agency--
-argued that the run-off of stormwaters onto the "downhill11 
adjoining propertyownei: was immunized from suit, by reason 
of the Act, because the district was engaged in the 
"management of floodwaters". This hypertechnical argument 
14 
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WAS REJECTED by the Supreme Court, which found that immunity 
for such "nuisance" claims had been waived pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 63-3 0-9, Utah Code. The Court wrote: 
We do not need to reach here the question of 
whether the second paragraph of section 63-30-3 
provides "absolute immunity" for the flood control 
activities of governmental entities. That is 
because we hold that defendants activities in the 
instant case simply do not come within the 
contemplation of paragraph two. In reviewing a 
summary judgment, we must evaluate the facts and 
all reasonable inferences fairly drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment. Guardian State Bank V. 
Humpherys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988); Horgan 
v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 
(Utah 1982). Under this standard of review, the 
facts in the record clearly indicate that 
plaintiff's damages from the runoff surface waters 
which are the subject of this action are not the 
result of defendant's "management of flood waters 
and other natural disasters (or] the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems." 
Defendant school district has no such statutory 
responsibility. Branam v. Provo School District, 
No. 20935, slip op. at 5 (Utah Sept. 14, 1989). 
Rather, plaintiff's damages appear to be the 
result of defendant's 1984 resurfacing of the 
school parking lot, which caused the runoff to 
flow onto plaintiff's property. The fact that 
defendant constructed a diversion curb along the 
edge of the parking lot in an effort to retain the 
runoff surface waters and divert them into a storm 
drain or gutter in front of the properties does 
not change our conclusion. We do not believe it 
was the legislature's intention in enacting the 
1984 amendment to shield defendant from possible 
liability for damages arising from its negligence 
in the resurfacing of a parking lot, a question of 
fact to be determined on remand. Like private 
property owners, owners of public property must 
exercise reasonable care in controlling surface 
water runoff. 
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780 P.2d at 820-821. Emphasis added. 
The odors, vapors and gases from the sewer vent pipe 
are, legally, no different that the runoff waters from the 
parking lot in Williams and for which the public entity may 
be held liable! [Indeed, if there is a difference between 
the sewer gases, odors and vapors and the runoff waters, it 
is only that in the case at bar that the JORDAN SCHOOL 
DISTRICT has intentionally acted to take those gases, vapors 
and odors which would arguably have remained in the 
underground sewer line and "vent" them into the atmosphere 
a mere 13 feet away from Plaintiffs' residence!] 
As the Williams decision correctly noted in connection 
with "management of flood waters", the Jordan School 
District in this case has NO STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY to 
manage "hazardous wastes" within the contemplation of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
Somewhat similar results are found in this Court's 
decision in Sanford vs University of Utah, 488 P. 2d 741, 26 
Utah 2d 285 (1971) [claims for "nuisance" injuries to 
neighbor not immunized under Governmental Immunity Act]. 
The Act indeed waives immunity (for "nuisance" caused 
by "dangerous or defective condition of a public building or 
improvement"). 
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Governmental entities are, under Utah law, liable for 
the negligent operation of sewer system. See Parrish vs 
Layton City, 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975). 
The District having an entire 12-acre "lot" on which 
to have its Riverton Elementary School building should not 
be able to position is "vent pipe" so it is a mere 17 feet 
away from the Plaintiffs' residence! Furthermore, the 
District ought not be allowed to mechanically "vent" those 
gases, odors, vapors, etc. into the atmosphere at that 
location! It's a nuisance! 
The Defendant acknowledged [page 6 of its Memorandum] 
that the materials contained within the sewer line (which it 
intentionally vented) approximately 17 feet from the 
Plaintiffs' residence, are "harmful and hazardous 
materials". Nevertheless, the School District attempts to 
shield itself under the cloak of immunity under Section 63-
30-10(18)(c) of the Immunity Act. 
Section 63-3 0-9 of the Governmental Immunity Act 
provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or 
defective condition of any public building, 
structure, dam, reservoir or other public 
improvement. Immunity is not waived for latent 
defective conditions. 
Emphasis added. It is Section 9 waiving immunity which 
17 
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defeats the District's claims: whether the school building 
itself or its sewer line is "defective" or whether the 
operation of the sewer vent pipe is "dangerous", immunity is 
waived. The District now claims the sewer gases are 
"hazardous materials": to knowingly vent those substances 
into the atmosphere immediately adjacent to a home must fall 
within the "dangerous condition" for which immunity has been 
waived! 
The District does not, per se, deny committing those 
activities. The District, however, relies entirely on the 
"governmental immunity" allegedly afforded it under Section 
63-30-10 (18) (c) ["handling, mitigating or regulating 
hazardous materials or hazardous wastes"]. The District has 
admitted [page 6 of its Memorandum] that the sewer gases and 
vapors are "hazardous materials". That admission 
corroborates the Plaintiff's factual assertions. Certainly 
the vent pipe located a few feet from the Plaintiffs' front 
door and but a few more feet from the Plaintiffs' backyard 
is a "nuisance" in the historic definition of the cause of 
action: an action predicated on a dangerous or defective 
condition of a public improvement that unreasonably 
interferes with the use and enjoyment of the claimant's 
property. 
18 
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B 
HYDROGEN SULFIDE GAS, AS A NATURALLY-OCCURRING 
BY-PRODUCT OF THE PUTRIFICATION OF DOMESTIC SEWAGE 
IN RELATIVELY SMALL QUANTITIES, IS NOT A 
"HAZARDOUS MATERIAL" FOR WHICH IMMUNITY ATTACHES 
The District submitted no affidavits asserting that the 
alleged "nuisance" is not a nuisance; rather, the District 
now claims that the gases, odors, fumes are "hazardous 
materials" and that it is, as a matter of law, immune from 
suit for such activities under Section 63-30-10 (18) (c) 
[immunity is not waived for liability arising out of 
activities associated with the "handling of hazardous 
wastes"]! Not only is this self-serving (at least in the 
context of the instant litigation), recently-contrived 
assertion (i.e. that the gases are "hazardous materials") 
obviously out-of-context within the clear meaning of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, Subsection 63-30-10(18) (c) , Utah 
Code, but with other applicable legislation as well. 
The argument of the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT (that it 
is "immune from suit") is predicated upon several incorrect 
interpretations or application of the law. These incorrect 
applications or interpretations are: 
1. That the Legislature intended to grant the 
School District "immunity" from suit when, in fact 
and/or in law, the District in reality was not 
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"handling, regulating or mitigating" the 
"hazardous" item, because: 
a. "hydrogen sulfide" ("rotten egg") 
gas emanating from regular domestic 
sewage is not so defined; 
b. the specific "hydrogen sulfide" gas 
allegedly "handled" or "mitigated" by the 
School District was NOT so "regulated" 
under the environmental protection laws, 
even though hydrogen sulfide in 
"industrial strength" quantities might be 
regulated. 
The legislative construction and analysis necessary to 
characterize the "hydrogen sulfide" gas within a sanitary 
sewer line as a "hazardous material" is similar to that for 
the "hazardous waste", but is even more complex, because the 
phrase arguably involves federal law. We must, however, 
begin at the starting point: the governmental immunity act. 
The argument of the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT, to be 
jurisprudentially correct if only on the "matter of law" 
issue, is as follows: 
Subsection 63-30-10 (18) retains "immunity" against 
suit for Section 8 ("dangerous condition of 
20 
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structures") AND for Section 9 ("defective public 
building or structure") BUT NOT for Section 10.5 
("inverse condemnation") claims if 
"the injury arises out of, in connection 
with, or results from: 
(18) the activities of: 
(c) r e g u l a t i n g , 
mitigating, or 
handling hazardous 
materials or hazardous 
wastes 
Thus, as the first step in the "daisy chain" (the 
undersigned's term) of jurisprudential logic is to determine 
whether or not the "hydrogen sulfide" is a "hazardous 
material" or a "hazardous waste". As the terms "hazardous 
material" and "hazardous waste" are NOT DEFINED within the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Court must refer to 
other statutes. 
The phrase "hazardous waste" IS DEFINED within state 
statute: at Section 19-6-102, "Definitions", as part of the 
"Solid and Hazardous Waste Act" of Utah. Under subsection 
(9), "hazardous waste" is so "defined" as: 
(9) "Hazardous waste" means a solid waste or 
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combination of solid wastes other than household 
waste which, because of its quantity, 
concentration, or physical, chemical, or 
infectious characteristics may cause or 
significantly increase serious irreversible or 
incapacitating reversible illness or may pose a 
substantial present or potential hazard to human 
health or the environment when improperly treated, 
stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise 
managed. 
Emphasis added. Thus, for the "hydrogen sulfide" gas to be 
a "hazardous waste", it must be a "solid waste", which is 
"defined" in Subsection 19-6-102(17), as follows: 
(17) (a) "Solid waste" means any garbage, refuse, 
sludge, including sludge from a waste treatment 
plan, water supply treatment plant, or air 
pollution control facility, or other discarded 
material, including solid, liquid, semi-solid, or 
contained gaseous material resulting from 
industrial, commercial/ mining, or agricultural 
operations and from community activities but does 
not include sclid or dissolved materials in 
domestic sewage or in irrigation return flows or 
discharges for which a permit is required under 
Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act, or under 
the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C., 
Section 1251 et seq. 
(b) [Subsection (b) identifies and pertains to 
certain "excepted" wastes, arguably not applicable 
in this situation]. 
Emphasis added. The first point of analysis would be to 
determine if the "hydrogen sulfide" (as a "gaseous 
material") is a "solid". It isn't! That conclusion should 
truncate any further need for analysis. 
But if we must go further, we look to see if the 
22 
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chemical compound results from "industrial, commercial, 
mining or agricultural operations". The Appellant believes 
the operation of the Riverton Elementary School does not 
fall within those four criteria. Continuing with the 
legislative analysis, is the hydrogen sulfide "gaseous 
material" result from an otherwise ambiguous "community 
activities", a term not elsewhere "defined". 
Continuing with the statutory analysis, is the gaseous 
material a "solid or dissolved materials in domestic 
sewage"? Arguably so. Does the phrase "domestic sewage" 
define or describe the routine sanitary sewer discharges 
from the Riverton Elementary School consisting entirely of 
human wastes from the school restroom facilities (sinks and 
toilets), drinking fountains, and/or the water discharges 
from food-preparation activities conducted within the school 
cafeteria? [While many might jokingly want to designate 
"school cafeteria food" as "hazardous waste", serious 
jurisprudence demands a more careful, deliberate analysis of 
the wording.] Yes! Does the usage of the phrase "domestic 
sewage" in this Section indicate a legislative intent that 
this "school domestic sewage" is IN FACT AND IN LAW not 
materially different in relative volume or in substance than 
the sanitary sewer discharges which might be characterized 
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as "domestic" (i.e. home, or residential) sewage coming from 
a private residence? Yes. [The analysis might arguably be 
different if we were dealing with a high school which might 
have a chemistry laboratory which utilizes the public sewer 
for its waste discharge.] The phrase "domestic sewage" is 
not so "defined", so the Court as with all wording must 
get to a point wherein the commonly-accepted meaning of 
common words must be utilized in the statutory construction. 
[Note, however, that the phrase "domestic sewage" IS DEFINED 
by administrative regulation as described below so as to 
NOT be a "solid waste", so it (the domestic sewage) could 
NOT be a "hazardous waste". ] 
Subsection 19-6-502, as "definitions" of the "Solid 
Waste Management Act", provides in relevant part: 
19-6-502. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(7) "Solid waste" means all putrescible 
and nonputrescible materials or 
substances discarded or rejected as being 
spent, useless, worthless, or in excess 
to the owner's needs at the time of 
discard or rejection, including garbage, 
refuse, industrial and commercial waste, 
sludges from air or water control 
facilities, irubbish, ashes, contained 
gaseous material, incinerator residue, 
demolition, and construction debris, 
discarded automobiles and offal, but not 
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including sewage and other highly diluted 
water carried materials or substances and 
those in gaseous form. 
Emphasis added. It is obvious that the Legislature does not 
believe or intend that "sewage" and or wastes "in gaseous 
form" be characterized as "solid wastes". The "bottom line" 
is that the statutory definition specifically EXCLUDES 
"domestic sewage" from the "definition" of "hazardous 
waste". That should end the discussion! 
The Riverton Elementary School sanitary sewer 
discharges, including the "gaseous material" in the form of 
the hydrogen sulfide ("rotten egg") gas, are contained 
within and contemplated by the phrase "domestic sewage" and 
thus, "hydrogen sulfide" gas from this type of activity 
(i.e. operation of the public school) IS NOT a "hazardous 
waste" within the meaning of state statutes, including 
Section 63-30-10(18)(c) of the Immunity Act. 
If the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT were truly entitled to 
have the hydrogen sulfide gas characterized as a "hazardous 
material" (as so "defined" and "regulated" under the "Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Act") as the Legislature may have 
intended, then the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT must have a 
state-issued PERMIT to handle and dispose of that "hazardous 
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waste". While production of such a state-issued permit 
REQUIRED pursuant to Section 19-6-113 (3) (b) (i) , Utah Code 
by the moving party might be discretionary within the 
context of a "motion for summary judgment" context, 
production of the "permit" would have been required pursuant 
to the Plaintiffs' pre-trial discovery. NO SUCH DOCUMENT WAS 
EVER PRODUCED! Thus, the inference must arise that THE 
DISTRICT DOES NOT HAVE SUCH A PERMIT. Given the fact that 
the state statute prescribes the knowing "disposal" of a 
"hazardous waste" as a FELONY, subjecting the responsible 
school district personnel to a $50,000 PER DAY "fine" and 
imprisonment for up to five years [Subsection 19-6-
113(4)(a)(ii)] and subjecting the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT 
to a $1,000,000 that's right, A MILLION DOLLARS fine 
[per 19-4-113(4) (c) (ii) , Utah Code.] District personnel who 
knowingly dispose of any "hazardous material" in violation 
of the Act and knowingly place another person "in imminent 
danger of death or serious bodily injury" Plaintiff SUE 
LOVENDAHL believes she has contracted asthma, a life-long 
and serious physiological condition from the repeated 
exposure to the sanitary sewer gases intentionally "vented" 
upon her can be subjected to a fine of $250,000 and 15 
years imprisonment. Section 19-6-113 (4) (c) (ii) , Utah Code.] 
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THE DISTRICT DIDN'T PRODUCE A "PERMIT" BECAUSE IT DOESN'T 
HAVE A "PERMIT"! 
The District's singular evidence on this specific point 
is the assertion of Mr Randal Haslam, an architect NOT A 
TRAINED CHEMIST OR ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENTIST, per se that 
the odorous gas the District was attempting to "dispose of" 
was "hydrogen sulfide". 
Obviously, counsel's cavalier characterization of the 
hydrogen sulfide as a "hazardous material" is severely 
misplaced! Similarly, if the "disposal" of a "hazardous 
waste" is so serious that is so severely punishable, it is 
doubtful ludicrous is more accurate that the State 
authorities would even authorize, through the "permit", the 
UNCONTROLLED and UNSUPERVISED discharge of the "hazardous 
waste", into the atmosphere and in a RESIDENTIAL 
NEIGHBORHOOD, a mere 17 feet away from the Plaintiffs' 
nearby residence! The Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT cannot now 
be seriously heard to claim as it does the gases are 
"hazardous wastes". 
The Defendant claims that the sewer gases, odors, etc. 
are "hazardous materials". This then raises the rhetorical 
question: if the odors, etc., are "hazardous materials", 
does the District have a state-issued "permit" under the 
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such materials? The District hasn't provided such a permit. 
Similarly, would the State of Utah "license" such an 
activity for which there is a $10,000 per day "fine" [per 
Section 19-6-306, Utah Code] for a violation to be 
conducted a mere 17 feet away from an occupied residential 
dwelling? None was ever produced by the District! 
The District's argument, as a "daisy chain" of 
ostensibly interconnected2 statutes and regulations, begins 
with state statute (the Governmental Immunity Act) and 
arguably ends, in part, in the federal statutes and 
regulations promulgated by the national government and its 
agencies. THE "DAISY CHAIN" CONNECTION HAS SOME MAJOR 
"HOLES" IN IT AND DOES NOT SUPPORT THE DEFENDANT'S SELF-
SERVING INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSIONS. The "daisy chain" 
connection obviously overlooks the express provisions of the 
statutes and regulations! 
The Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT has attempted and at 
the trial court was successful in "playing fast and loose" 
with the operational and substantive "definitions" of term-
2Judge Nehring of the District Court openly acknowledged 
during the oral argument at the summary judgment hearing that he 
was "unable to follow" the various statutes and regulations and the 
Defendant's attempted interwoven relationship between them. 
28 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
of-art phrases. The Appellants' analysis will attempt to be 
more careful. 
C 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS EXPRESSLY PROVIDE 
THAT DOMESTIC SEWAGE 
IS NOT A "HAZARDOUS WASTE" 
The Plaintiffs' interpretation (that the hydrogen 
sulfide is NOT "hazardous waste") is further bolstered by 
the administrative agency regulations adopted pursuant to 
statutory authority [Section 19-6-106, Utah Code] and for 
the purpose of implementing and enforcing those regulatory 
functions. 
Administrative Regulation R315-1-1, pertaining to "Utah 
Hazardous Waste Definitions and References", incorporates 
for the purposes of the "administrative regulations" the 
statutory definitions contained in Sections 19-6-102, Utah 
Code. R315-1-1. The administrative regulations EXCLUDE 
"domestic sewage" from being a "solid waste", which thus 
precludes those materials from being a "hazardous waste", by 
providing in relevant part: 
R315-2-4. Exclusions. 
(a) MATERIALS WHICH ARE NOT SOLID WASTES. 
The following materials are not solid wastes for 
the purposes of this rule: 
(1) Domestic sewage or any mixture of 
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domestic sewage and other wastes that 
passes through a sewer system to a 
publicly-owned treatment works for 
treatment. "Domestic sewage" means 
untreated sanitary wastes that pass 
through a sewer system. 
Emphasis added. The Riverton Elementary School sanitary 
sewer wastes at issue in this litigation are "untreated 
sanitary wastes that pass through a sewer system", per the 
second sentence of the "definition". Thus, working 
backwards, the "domestic sewage" is not a "solid waste" and 
thus it is not a "hazardous waste". End of discussion! 
[Arguably, the foregoing "definitions" and analysis might be 
restricted by narrowing language within the statute or the 
regulations such as "for the purpose of this rule" or 
words of similar import. The Appellants caution the Court 
against indulging in such a limiting "definitional" 
endeavor, as might be suggested by the Defendant SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. Do so leads to absurd results.] 
D 
SEWER LINE "HYDROGEN SULFIDE" GAS 
IS NOT A "HAZARDOUS MATERIAL" 
UNDER FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Subsection 19-6-302 of the "Hazardous Substances 
Mitigation Act" of Utah defines "hazardous materials", by 
providing in relevant part: 
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19-6-3 02. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(7) "Hazardous materials" means 
hazardous waste as defined in the Utah 
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, 
PCBs, dioxin, asbestos, or a substance 
regulated under 42 U.S.C., Section 
6991(2). 
Emphasis added. 
It is noteworthy that although Section 19-6-302(7) 
"defines" the phrase "hazardous materials", the phrase 
"hazardous materials" IS NOT FURTHER EVEN MENTIONED within 
the remainder of the statutory provisions. The statute 
utilizes instead the phrase "hazardous substances", which is 
"defined" at Section 19-6-302(8), as follows: 
(8) "Hazardous substances" means the definition of 
hazardous substances contained in CERCLA [a 
federal statute for environmental protection] 
Bracketed material added for clarity. Note that the phrase 
"hazardous substances" is, thus, different- from and 
distinguishable from the phrase "hazardous materials". 
Although "hazardous substances" is not so utilized in the 
remainder of the statute, the phrase "hazardous materials" 
is nevertheless so "defined" to be one of the following 
items: 
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1. a "hazardous waste" as defined in the Utah 
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations; 
2. a PCB; 
3. dioxin; 
4. asbestos; or 
5. a substance regulated under 42 U.S. C. , Section 
6991(2). 
Emphasis added. 
The analysis shown above evidences that the hydrogen 
sulfide IS NOT a "hazardous waste as defined in the Utah 
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations". It is beyond 
dispute and the Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT does not claim--
-that "hydrogen sulfide" gas is NOT "a PCB", "dioxin", or 
"asbestos". 
The DISTRICT does, however, claim that the "hydrogen 
sulfide" is "a substance regulated under 42 U.S.C., Section 
6991." In analyzing the meaning of the federal statutes, one 
must first consider what the Utah Legislature had in mind 
when it utilized the words "a substance regulated under 42 
U.S.C., Section 6991(2)". 
In the instant situation, there is NO FACTUAL 
"regulation" of the hydrogen sulfide "vented" by the 
District from its sewer line at the Riverton Elementary 
School! In this context, the Utah Legislature utilized the 
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word "regulated" as contrasted with the word "defined". 
The wording "regulated under" connotes a FACTUAL REGULATION. 
The Defendant SCHOOL DISTRICT did not show and the 
Plaintiffs have always disputed that the sewer line 
"hydrogen sulfide" and its disposition is thus FACTUALLY 
"regulated". To the contrary, the District seems to be able 
to merely dispose of the hydrogen sulfide at its whim: 
blowing as much as it can into the atmosphere. NO PERMIT 
FROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OR ITS AGENCIES TO DO SO HAS 
BEEN PRODUCED either in the Defendant's responses to 
Plaintiff's "pre-trial discovery" (which asked, inter alia, 
for such documentation and information) or to the District 
Court at the summary judgment hearing! So the question 
arises as to the intention of the Utah Legislature, with 
respect to the usage of the term "regulated". Obviously, the 
District is not at all acting as though its disposal of the 
hydrogen sulfide gas is so "regulated": through the federal 
permitting process, with fines, etc. if the law isn't 
followed. On the contrary, the District has blown as much as 
it can into the atmosphere! 
The Defendant has asserted [page 6 of its District 
Court SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM] that the Utah Hazardous 
Wastes Board has adopted through inclusion of the federal 
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statutory provisions a definition to include hydrogen 
sulfide in its listing of "hazardous waste". The Defendants 
argument is in error! Defendant asserts: 
The Board's administrative Rule R315-l-l(b) 
adopts, with revisions not pertinent here, "the 
terms defined in 40 CFR 260.10. Section 260.10 
defines the term "hazardous waste" as "a hazardous 
waste as defined in §261.3 of this chapter. 
Section 261.3, in turn, defines hazardous waste as 
a solid waste which is not excluded by another 
section (again not pertinent here) which meets any 
of certain listed criteria. 
Page 6 of Defendant's SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM. RECORD AT 
210. Emphasis added. 
The quoted paragraph grossly misstates the law on this 
subject. Section 261.4, pertaining to "Exclusions", (which 
was expressly not quoted and which was claimed to be "not 
pertinent"), is ABSOLUTELY PERTINENT, when it provides: 
§261.4 Exclusions. 
(a) Materials which are not solid wastes. The 
following materials are not solid wastes for the 
purposes of this part: 
(1)(i) Domestic sewage; and 
(ii) Any mixture of domestic sewage 
and other wastes that passes through a 
sewer system to a publicly-owned 
treatment works for treatment. "Domestic 
sewage" means untreated sanitary wastes 
that pass through a sewer system. 
Emphasis added. It is obvious that the Defendant has 
conveniently ignored the provisions of the controlling 
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regulation! 
In similar vein, Defendant's assertion that the listing 
of "hydrogen sulfide" within 40 C.F.R. §261.33 is similarly 
incorrect and out of context! This inappropriateness 
bordering upon an affirmative misleading of the Court as a 
matter of law is illustrated by a careful reading of the 
federal regulation, as follows: 
§261.33 Discarded commercial chemical products, 
off-specification species, container residues, and 
spill residues thereof. 
The following materials or items are hazardous 
wastes if and when they are discarded or intended 
to be discarded as described in §261.2(a)(2)(i), 
when they are mixed with waste oil or used oil or 
other material and applied to the land for dust 
suppression or road treatment, when they are 
otherwise applied to the land in lieu of their 
original intended use or when they are contained 
in products that are applied to the land when, in 
lieu of their original intended use, they are 
produced for use as (or as a component of) a fuel, 
distributed for use as a fuel, or burned as a 
fuel. 
(f) The commercial chemical products, 
manufacturing chemical intermediates, or off-
specification commercial chemical products 
referred to in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this 
section, are identified as toxic wastes (T) , 
unless otherwise designated and are subject to the 
small quantity generator exclusion defined in 
§261.5 (a) and (g) . These wastes and their 
corresponding EPA Hazardous Waste Numbers are: 
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U-135 7783-06-4 Hydrogen sulfide H2S 
Emphasis added. That "hydrogen sulfide" is so listed does 
not mean that is a "hazardous waste". To the contrary! The 
"listing" is grossly out-of-context, and almost 
intentionally so. 
The Defendant's analysis of the other "federal 
provisions" and/or the applicability or interpretation 
thereof is similarly flawed. It is ludicrous to think that 
the federal Clean Air Act designates "hydrogen sulfide" as 
a "hazardous material" as Defendant claims and yet the 
Defendant, WITHOUT ANY KIND OF PERMIT OR RESTRICTION is 
allowed, with apparent impunity, to discharge untold 
quantities of that pollutant into the atmosphere! 
It is no wonder that the District Court "could not 
follow1' the Defendant's explanation as to the legal 
principles as to why the sewer gases were "hazardous 
materials". That the Defendant apparently intentionally 
chose to not include these provisions within its brief must 
have been intentional: so as to mislead the Court. 
In the instant situation, there is NO FACTUAL 
"regulation" of the hydrogen sulfide "vented" by the 
District from its sewer line, IN UNCONTROLLED QUANTITIES 
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INTO THE ATMOSPHERE! In this context, the Utah Legislature 
utilized the word "regulated" as contrasted with the word 
"defined". The wording "regulated under" connotes a FACTUAL 
REGULATION. The hydrogen sulfide is not FACTUALLY 
"regulated". 
That "hydrogen sulfide" is so listed does not mean that 
such a "listing" is grossly out-of-context, and almost 
intentionally so. The "hydrogen sulfide" with which we are 
here dealing is not the same "hydrogen sulfide" as described 
to be a "commercial chemical product", applied "to the 
land", etc. The "hydrogen sulfide" gas, in relatively minute 
quantities within the "domestic sewage" from the Riverton 
Elementary School, are not and were not intended to be 
"discarded" as described in the federal regulations! The 
mere "listing" of the "hydrogen sulfide" chemical within a 
long "laundry list" enumeration of chemical substances does 
not make the Riverton Elementary School "hydrogen sulfide" 
a "hazardous material" or "hazardous waste", when the 
introductory text (and other regulations) obviously and 
expressly mandate a contrary conclusion. The FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS, as cited by the Defendant, DO NOT APPLY TO THE 
CASE AT HAND! The citation of those regulations is 
inappropriate and intentionally-misleading. 
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It is no wonder that the District Court "could not 
follow" the Defendant's explanation as to the legal 
principles as to why the gases were "hazardous materials". 
Obviously, the Defendant's claimed statutory defense 
(i.e. immunity not waived for activities related to the 
"handling of hazardous materials or hazardous wastes" is an 
illusory argument, born of desperation and not deserving of 
judicial belief or application!] It is incredible that the 
District Court openly acknowledging that it "could not 
follow" the "daisy chain" analysis and argument would 
nevertheless "buy into" that same argument and grant summary 
judgment. That judgment must be overturned! 
II 
IMMUNITY HAS BEEN WAIVED 
FOR "INVERSE CONDEMNATION" CLAIMS 
The Riverton Elementary School is located on a 12-acre 
site. The vent pipe is at the extreme northeast corner of 
the parcel, hundreds and hundreds of feet away from the 
school building and almost at the extreme perimeter of the 
school property. The vent pipe is a mere 5 feet from the 
Plaintiffs' property line and a mere 17 feet from the corner 
of the Plaintiffs' residence. The "vented" odors, vapors, 
fumes and gases sucked from the sewer line surround the vent 
and unreasonably interfere with the use of the residential 
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property. In essence and in actuality, the DISTRICT has 
"condemned" and "taken" the Plaintiffs' private property as 
much as if the DISTRICT were to have initiated and pursued 
a formal eminent domain proceeding to acquire sufficient 
real estate for the de facto dumping ground! 
Subsection 63-30-10.5(1) of the Act clearly provides: 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of all 
government entities is waived for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity when the 
governmental entity has taken or damaged private 
property for public uses without just 
compensation. 
Emphasis added. The intentional and foreseeable use of the 
Plaintiffs' real estate as a "dumping ground" for the 
"hazardous materials" odors, vapors, gases and fumes from 
the sanitary sewer system is as much of a "taking" and a 
"damaging" as if the DISTRICT had formally "condemned" the 
property! That the property was so "taken" or "damaged" FOR 
PUBLIC USES is confirmed by the fact that the DISTRICT 
didn't want the fumes, odors, etc. in the Elementary School, 
so it intentionally "dumped" them nearby on the Plaintiff's 
real estate! 
Before the trial court the District asserted, but did 
not present any "hard evidence" (such as sworn affidavits or 
the actual depositions), that the Plaintiffs had testified 
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they had no professional appraisal evidence to indicate a 
permanent diminution in value to their real estate. Such was 
(and is) a blatant mischaracterization of the Plaintiffs' 
position and testimony. 
Had such "answers to interrogatories" and "depositions" 
actually been "published" and "presented" to the Court, they 
would have evidenced a consistently clear picture, as 
alleged by the Plaintiffs, as follows: 
Q. [by Mr Ostler] So you think that the soil is 
somehow contaminated by the gases? 
A. [by Sue Lovendahl] Yes, I do. 
Q. Do you have any basis in fact other than 
supposition, for that assertion? 
A. Dead lawn, dead flowers, dead trees. 
Q. And that's still the case today? 
A. It's better today, but there's still areas in 
the front yard that you can't plant or do anything 
with. 
Q. And the pipe isn't there any longer; correct? 
A. No, it's not. 
Q. And you're claiming that the fact that the 
pipe was one there is killing your lawn and your 
trees. 
A. It killed them. It's not killing them now. 
They're no longer there. 
Affidavit of Sue Lovendahl, page 13, lines 9 through 23. 
Emphasis added. 
The Plaintiffs' responses contained within "answers to 
interrogatories" are supportive of the "damaging" claim: 
INTERROGATORY No. 11. State whether you claim a 
pecuniary loss as a result of the nuisance and if 
so, state: 
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a. The nature and amount of each loss; 
b. The date of each loss; and 
c. The identify of each document containing 
information about the answer to this 
Interrogatory. 
ANSWER/RESPONSE: . . . The grass in the backyard 
lawn of the residence died completely; in the 
frontyard a portion of the lawn died. Following 
the installation and operation of the "vent" pipe, 
the decorative flowers did not grow as well as in 
the past. The family members could not work in the 
yard without risk of a full-blown asthma "attack", 
which was never experienced before the "vent" pipe 
was installed and operated. A person could not 
walk outside into the yard from the house without 
the odor almost knocking one over. A person could 
not cook outside on the barbecue because of the 
strong odor coming from the "vent" pipe. The odors 
from the outside were "sucked" into the residence 
through operation of the swamp cooler during 
summer months. 
After exposure to the odor and gases, it 
seemed as if one's nose was stuffed with cotton. 
The full effect of the smell was not known until 
visitors would come to our home and say "What is 
that smell?" 
We considered selling the house, but the 
realtor with whom we consulted indicated we would 
have to disclose the existence of the "vent" pipe 
and possibly pay for some testing of it. We 
decided to forego selling until we could do 
something about the "vent" pipe. 
The Plaintiffs believe that their unwilling 
subjection to the harmful, dangerous and offensive 
odors, gases and vapors, from the sanitary sewer 
through the District-installed "vent" pipe, when 
the District knew of the "nuisance" it was 
intentionally creating, together with the life-
long exposure to asthma, asthma-like and flu-like 
symptoms justifies their claim of $50,000 
compensatory damages for each of the three 
plaintiffs [$150,000 total], plus court costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in bringing and 
maintaining this action. 
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INTERROGATORY No. 12. Identify each document 
which you claim supports your allegation that a 
nuisance exists on the property. 
ANSWER/RESPONSE: The documents provided in 
Defendant's responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of 
Requests for Production of Documents. 
See also the documents identified or referred to 
in the answer/response to other Interrogatories. 
INTERROGATORY No. 13. State the degree of taking 
which you claim upon the property and each and 
every act which you allege constitutes the taking. 
ANSWER/RESPONSE: See the P l a i n t i f f s ' 
answer/response to Interrogatories No. 11, above. 
The Defendant Jordan School District, rather than 
having the harmful gases, odors and vapors fall 
upon its own large parcel, thus endangering its 
own employees and the schoolchildren entrusted to 
its care, located the sanitary sewer "vent" pipe 
to be immediately adjacent to the Plaintiffs' 
residence. The Defendant Jordan School District 
knew or should have known of the offensive and 
dangerous condition it was creating in "venting" 
large quantities of such odors, gases and vapors 
into the atmosphere. The "taking" of the 
Plaintiffs' property and/or the unreasonable 
interference with the reasonable usage of that 
real property was just as effectively accomplished 
as if the governmental entity (the school 
district) had initiated and consummated eminent 
domain proceedings to acquire the real estate for 
that very purpose: as a "dumping ground" for the 
offensive odors, etc., from the sanitary sewer! 
Answers to Interrogatories. Dated as of 22 May 1999. Signed 
under oath by Sue Lovendahl. Emphasis added. 
Obviously, there was substantial "damage" to the 
"private property" of the Plaintiffs. That Defendant's 
counsel would, in self-serving fashion, represent to the 
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Court that there was no permanent damage to Plaintiffs' real 
estate is misleading, at best. First, because when the 
depositions had actually been taken (in September 2000) , the 
sewer "vent pipe" had been "capped" pursuant to Court 
order (preliminary injunction), issued in March 1998, some 
two and one-half years earlier! That the damage did not 
result in a permanent taking, does not mean that there was 
not the "damaging" identified! It is obvious that the 
"property taken or damaged" claim is and was viable. That 
counsel would tend to characterize the Plaintiffs' claims as 
being not permanent, so therefore they weren't for "damage" 
to the property is simply a mischaracterization of fact! 
Subsequent to the installation of the sewer vent pipe, 
Plaintiff SUE LOVENDAHL, who had no previously-diagnosed 
symptoms or family-history thereof, contracted asthma a 
disease of the lungs. [Although the other co-plaintiffs 
JAMES LOVENDAHL and WESLEY LOVENDAHL developed temporary 
symptoms headaches, nausea, etc. during their exposure 
to the sewer gases prior to the "capping" of the vent pipe, 
they have as of the present not been medically diagnosed 
with any permanent damage.] Are not her "lungs" the "private 
property" which has been "damaged" for "public use" (i.e. 
the venting of the sewer gases so close to her home)? 
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As no evidence was actually before the Court at the 
"summary judgment hearing" on the "taking or damaging" 
issue, there was no basis for the Court to make any 
"findings" on that factually-intensive issue! 
Similarly, the trial court erred in its ruling. The 
"inverse condemnation" claims under Section 63-30-10.5 are 
not subject to retained immunity; for such claims immunity 
has been waived and their is NO RETENTION of immunity, 
notwithstanding Section 63-30-10. See Hansen vs Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990), in which the Court 
observed: 
. . . we now make clear that governmental immunity 
cannot apply to prohibit suit or recovery under an 
inverse condemnation theory. That would be 
unconstitutional under the interpretation we have 
given article I, section 22 in Colman. 
Id. at 794. Emphasis added. 
Indeed, any argument that the Governmental Immunity Act 
can otherwise restrict or limit "inverse condemnation" 
claims brought as this case so is under the "self-
executing" provisions of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution would themselves be unconstitutional. The 
Legislature itself in adoption of Section 63-3 0-10 . 5 has 
clearly not intended a retention of immunity. The District 
Court incorrectly concluding that 63-30-10(18) (c) 
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"trumped" everything should not be allowed to override 
both the Constitution and the express terms of the Act, in 
compliance with the Constitution! 
IV 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS REQUIRING THE DISTRICT 
TO MAINTAIN ODOR-FREE CLASSROOMS CANNOT BE CONSTRUED 
TO SHIELD THE DISTRICT FROM IMMUNITY FOR NUISANCE OR 
FROM "INVERSE CONDEMNATION" CLAIMS 
The Defendant claimed in the District Court that 
the District was mandated by state administrative 
regulation to keep the classrooms "odor free". Those 
arguments, insofar as "authority" for immunity from the 
"nuisance" and/or "taking" claims of the Plaintiffs, are 
misplaced. While the administrative regulations [R392-200-1 
and R392-200-6 (2) (b) ] generally require the District to have 
odor-free classrooms, those provisions are merely 
suggestive. The Defendant IGNORES the effect of Regulation 
R392-200(3) (J), which provides as follows: 
J. Hazardous Wastes 
1. General. Disposal of hazardous wastes shall 
comply with the Utah hazardous waste management 
rules and applicable local regulations. 
Emphasis added. The State School Board, as promulgator of 
those administrative regulations, obviously intended that 
the Jordan School District follow "the law" rather than 
become a law unto itself. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court's ruling (as to retention of 
immunity) based upon the fast-and-loose "daisy chain" 
recitation of federal regulations and statutes, out-of-
context, is flawed. The Utah statutes expressly exclude the 
"domestic sewage" (which is what the effluent from the 
Riverton Elementary School really is) from being "hazardous 
wastes" (and/or "hazardous materials"). Consequently, the 
Plaintiffs' claims for "nuisance" should stand. 
Similarly, the District Court's ruling dismissing the 
"inverse condemnation" was erroneous. First, because the 
facts with respect to the "damaging" or "taking" were in 
dispute. [Plaintiff submitted no hard evidence (affidavits, 
etc.) to show otherwise.] Secondly, the District Court 
improperly assumed that the provisions of Section 63-30-10 
[immunity retained] superseded the provisions of Section 63-
3 0-10.5 [immunity waived for inverse condemnation claims]. 
That decision mus-t be reversed. 
The Defendant's assertions as to entitlement to 
immunity and/or summary judgment due to its attempt to 
comply with the "clean indoor air" regulations promulgated 
by the State School Board are likewise spurious. 
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tfully submitted this 9th day of October, 2001. Respec 
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